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I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent widespread enactment of grandparent visitation
statutes, grandparents' legal access to their grandchildren changed
dramatically. Under the common law, grandparents were generally
denied the legal right to bring a separate grandchild visitation suit.
Currently, every state in the nation has a statute granting grandpar-
ents the legal right to seek court-ordered visitation. These statutes
embody a remarkable shift away from the concept of exclusive paren-
tal control and toward a right of access for grandparents based upon
their status in the family.
Nebraska joined this wave of change when it became the final state
in the nation to adopt a grandparent visitation statute. The Nebraska
statute allows grandparents separate grandchild visitation rights if
they can establish that they share a significant beneficial relationship
with their grandchild and that visitation is in the best interests of the
child.' The Nebraska legislature did not provide a definition for the
somewhat vague "best interest of the child" standard. As a result, it
was left to the judiciary to breathe life into grandparents' newly ac-
quired legal rights.
In Eberspacher v. Hulme,2 the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed
an appellate court decision granting separate and reasonable visita-
tion rights to the grandparents of Rex Eberspacher and Tricia
Hulme's children. In so doing, the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to
follow its own standard of judicial review previously set forth in a sim-
ilar grandparent visitation case.3 As a result, the Eberspacher deci-
sion increases the level of uncertainty that plagues the "best interests
of the child" analysis under the Nebraska Grandparent Visitation
Rights Statute.4
This Note analyzes the impact that the Eberspacher decision has
on grandparent visitation rights and criticizes the failure of the court
1. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1801 (Reissue 1993).
2. 248 Neb. 202, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995).
3. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994).
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1801 (Reissue 1993).
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to adhere to a clearly mandated standard of review. The Note begins
by examining the history of grandparent visitation rights within the
United States, and more specifically, within Nebraska. An examina-
tion of the facts and holding of the Eberspacher opinion follows. Part
IV analyzes the standard of review set forth by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in the first grandparent visitation rights decision and the stan-
dard as it was properly applied by the Nebraska Court of Appeals in
Eberspacher. This Note then criticizes the supreme court's failure to
follow its own precedent which results in a superfluous review at the
appellate level, as well as an uncertain approach for analyzing the
"best interests of the child." The Note concludes that while the Ne-
braska legislature did not define the phrase "best interests of the
child," the legislature did not intend the judiciary to decide grandpar-
ent visitation cases based on vague, illusory factors, centered on
whatever criteria a judge feels is important.
II. THE HISTORY OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS
A. The Development of National Grandparent Visitation
Rights
With the dynamics of the American family constantly changing,
family law must undergo a concomitant change.5 Under the common
law, grandparents generally had no visitation rights; rather visitation
was left to the behest of the parents, and grandparents were left to
rely on a parent's moral obligation to allow visitation.6 Courts justi-
fied their denial of grandparent visitation rights with a number of rea-
sons.7 Some judges reasoned that granting individual visitation
rights to grandparents would undermine parental authority.8 An-
5. See Ross A. Thompson, et al., Grandparent Visitation Rights: Legalizing the Ties
that Bind, 44 Am. PSYCHOL. 1217, 1217 (1989)(positing that legislators should
exercise care not to change the nature of families through laws, but merely create
laws to accommodate those changes in family life that have already occurred.).
6. Ann M. Jackson, The Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 Am. U.
L. REv. 563, 573-74 (1994).
7. Catherine M. Gillman, Note, One Big, Happy Family? In Search of a More Rea-
soned Approach to Grandparent Visitation in Minnesota, 79 MDNn. L. REv. 1279,
1284 (1995). See also GRANDPARENT VISITATION DispuTEs: A LEGAL RESOURCE
MANUAL 24 (Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp eds., 1989)(listing common law ratio-
nales for disallowing grandparent visitation rights.).
8. Jackson, supra note 6, at 573-74. See, e.g., Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724,
726 (D.C. 1962)(stating that, as a rule of law, grandparents have no legal stand-
ing through which visitation may be granted); Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947)(explaining that permitting grandparents to intervene
in the parental right to raise their children would "injuriously hinder proper pa-
rental authority by dividing it."). See also Ross A. Thompson, et al., Grandparent
Visitation Rights: Emergent Psychological and Psycholegal Issues, in HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW, 292, 294 (Dorothy Kagehiro & W. Laufer eds., 1992)
(courts' justifications for denying grandparent visitation rights included concerns
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other justification provided by courts rested on the ground that plac-
ing a child in the middle of an inter-generational conflict would
adversely affect the development of the grandchild.9 Yet another jus-
tification found courts holding that parental autonomy is a fundamen-
tal constitutional right that should not be infringed upon by the grant
of separate grandparent visitation rights.1O
Recently, however, in response to the "increasing number of un-
married or divorced parents, the existence of step-families, the es-
trangement of extended families, the decrease in the number of
grandchildren, and the increased longevity of grandparents, all fifty
states, but not the District of Colombia, have enacted statutes giving
grandparents visitation rights."11 These statutes are designed, in
part, to provide stability and security to children faced with the unpre-
dictable ebb and flow of modem family life.
Recent research supports the premise that there often exists a
"special bond" between grandparents and grandchildrenl 2 that can
lend children a level of emotional security in times of uncertainty. Ad-
ditionally, new studies highlight a number of beneficial roles that
that giving independent rights to grandparents would undermine parental au-
thority and the parents' ability to raise their children as they considered best).
9. See, e.g., Nall v. Nall, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950)(explaining that
the relationship between grandparents and their son is irrelevant; grandparents
simply have no legal standing to seek separate visitation rights); Commonwealth
ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A-2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1943)(explaining that requiring a
child to visit with grandparents may lead to both physical and emotional trauma
in the child); Cox v. Stayton, 619 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Ark. 1981)(holding that "to
create new, enforceable rights in grandparents could lead to results that would
burden... the welfare of the child.").
10. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 (Tenn. 1993)(holding that the
Tennessee grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional because it
granted separate visitation rights over the objection of both parents); Theodore R.
v. Loretta J., 476 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)(court denied grandpar-
ent visitation rights, reasoning "[t~here should not be any judicial interference
with the fundamental constitutional rights of a parent.. . .") Contra Herndon v.
Tugey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208-09 (Mo. 1993)(holding parents' constitutional right to
raise their children is not absolute, as a result, the Missouri grandparent visita-
tion statute, granting separate visitation over the objection of both parents, is not
unconstitutional). See also Mark Moody, Constitutional Questions Regarding
Grandparent Visitation and Due Process Standards, 60 Mo. L. REv. 195 (1995)
(tracing the development of parents' constitutional right to rear their children);
Judith L. Shandling, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparent's Visitation
Statutes, 86 COLmz. L. REv. 118, 125-26 (1986) (explaining the Supreme Court's
recognition of parents' fundamental liberty interests in raising their children as
following from a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court struck down state
statutes as "unreasonably [interfering] with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
11. Jackson, supra note 6, at 563-64.
12. Rebecca Brown, Grandparent Visitation and the Intact Family, 16 S. Ii. U. L.J.
133, 147-48 (1991).
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grandparents can fulfill in children's lives.13 Social scientists identify
at least four "symbolic" roles that explain the various ways in which
grandparents influence their families.14 First, the understated "being
there"'15 role requires simply that a grandparent maintain a presence
within the family that benefits grandchildren in two ways. The pres-
ence of a grandparent "mitigates against the obtrusive events of the
outside world and disruptive events of role transitions ... [and] serves
to maintain the identity of the family."'16 Additionally, in times of
transition, such as "the birth of a sibling or during divorce, a grand-
parent's presence may exert a calming influence on grandchildren."17
The second role that a grandparent may fulfill is that of the "family
watchdog."' 5 This role finds the grandparent maintaining a vigilant
watch for signs of abuse or neglect that "might indicate that the chil-
dren need additional care or attention."'19 The third role, that of arbi-
trator, finds the grandparent acting as an impartial, third party
mediator between children and their parents. This role requires the
grandparents to "actively negotiate between parents and children con-
cerning values and behavior that may be more central, in the long run,
to family continuity and individual enhancement than those that the
parents' authority status allow to be expressed."20 The fourth impor-
tant role finds grandparents acting as "interpreters" of the family his-
tory.21 Grandparents may help children construct a greater sense of
identity if they can build connections between the family's past, pres-
ent, and future.2 2 In sum, "[v]isits with a grandparent are often a
precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which de-
volve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grandpar-
ents which he cannot derive from any other relationship."23
While it has long been recognized that grandparents play an im-
portant role in their grandchildren's lives, it took a significant level of
13. See, e.g., VERN L. BENGSTON, DrivEsrrY AND SYNMoLsmM iN GRANimPAENTA
ROLES 21 (Vern L. Bengston & Joan F. Robertson eds., 1985) (explaining the vari-
ous roles that sociologists recognize in grandparent-grandchild relationships.).
14. Id.
15. This phrase means that the grandparent maintains an active physical presence
in the grandchild's life. Patricia S. Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model
Statute, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 109, 109 (1988).
16. BENGSTON, supra note 13, at 22.
17. Id. at 22.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 23.
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id.
23. Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (N.J. 1975). But see Thompson, supra note 5,
300-07 (arguing that the assumption that the grandparent relationship necessar-
ily benefits children misrepresents the "heterogeneity of grandparenting styles
and their effects on children and the diverse influences mediating the impact of
the grandparenting relationship on grandchildren").
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pressure from strong, politically active grandparent groups, to provide
the necessary influence to move legislatures towards implementing
visitation statutes.24
While every state has implemented grandparent visitation stat-
utes, a brief survey of state visitation statutes reveals several glaring
differences among the laws.25 As an example, Delaware law provides
that courts may grant grandparents reasonable visitation rights "re-
gardless of marital status of the parents.., or the relationship of the
grandparents to the person having custody of the child; provided, how-
ever, that when the natural or adoptive parents of the child are cohab-
iting as husband and wife, grandparental visitation may not be
granted over both parents' objection."26 By contrast, Kentucky law al-
lows for the following liberal visitation rights: "The circuit court may
grant reasonable visitation rights to... grandparents of a child... if
it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do s0."27
Maine law provides that "[t]he court may award reasonable rights of
contact with a minor child to any third persons."28
Tennessee's sweeping statute grants grandparents visitation
rights "upon a finding that such visitation rights would be in the best
interests of the minor child."29 Moreover, the statute "shall not apply
in the case of any child who has been adopted by any person other
than a relative of the child or a stepparent of the child."30 The Ten-
nessee statute also provides for grandparent visitation "if the child is
placed in a foster home upon an analysis of the grandparents' past
record for a determination of any criminal wrongdoing."a1 Vermont
law only allows for grandparent visitation if a "parent of a minor child
is deceased, physically or mentally incapable of making a decision or
has abandoned the child. ... "32 In addition, the Vermont statute
lists eight factors to consider when determining the child's best inter-
24. Jackson, supra note 6, at 563-65 (citing Grandparents'Rights: Preserving Gener-
ational Bonds: Hearing Before the Subcomr. on Human Services of the House
Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991)(claiming that senior citi-
zens are "the most active lobby in this country, and when it comes to grandpar-
ents there is no one group more united in their purpose.")). See also Andre P.
Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Rendering Family Dissension More
Pronounced, 55 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 277, 282 (1985)(asserting that the in-
creased demand for grandparent visitation rights is attributable to today's more
active grandparents as well as to receptive legislators who respond to the political
power exerted by senior citizens.).
25. Jackson, supra note 6, at 568-69.
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (Supp. 1994).
27. Ky. REx. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1991).
28. AT. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302 (1991).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1012 (1989).
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est, and visitation rights are automatically terminated upon the adop-
tion of the child by someone other than a relative of the child.3
Arguably, this lack of cohesiveness among statutes "prevents par-
ents and grandparents from fully understanding their custody and
visitation rights"34 and increases the litigation involving grandparent
visitation statutes.3 5
B. Nebraska Law
Before 1986, Nebraska law afforded no legal avenue through which
grandparents could seek visitation of their grandchildren. While
there is a paucity of cases in this area, at least one case sets forth the
traditional common law approach to grandparent visitation rights.
In the case of In Re Ditter,36 the Nebraska Supreme Court denied
the request of paternal grandparents for visitation with their
grandchildren while the children were involved in an adoption pro-
ceeding.3 7 After noting that the common law did not recognize visita-
tion rights for grandparents, the court held that "once the natural
parents' rights to a child have been terminated,... the parents of the
parent whose rights have been terminated likewise lose any legal
right to visitation."38 Thus, since the parental rights of the father
were terminated, any derivative rights that the grandparents might
have been entitled to were likewise terminated. Consequently, under
Nebraska law, there existed no legal right for a grandparent to seek
visitation of his or her grandchild.
In 1986, the Nebraska legislature made Nebraska the final state in
the union to enact a grandparent visitation rights statute that re-
versed the traditional common law approach.3 9 The statute contains
three distinct provisions that govern a grandparent's standing to peti-
tion for visitation. The first section grants courts jurisdiction to hear a
petition from a grandparent when the child's parent or parents are
deceased.40 A dissolution provision affords the parents of either party
33. Id. §§ 1013, 1016 (1989).
34. Jackson, supra note 6, at 569.
35. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 1221 (arguing that explicit standards regarding
grandparent visitation might allow families to "bargain in the shadow of the law"
because clear standards allow potential litigants to predict probable results of
litigation, thereby diminishing grandparent visitation cases and encouraging in-
tra-family negotiations to resolve the dispute).
36. 212 Neb. 855, 326 N.W.2d 675 (1982).
37. The grandparents sought visitation rights after the rights of their son, the chil-
dren's natural father, were terminated. In Ditter the children's natural mother
was deceased, having been murdered by the natural father who was sentenced to
life in prison. Id. at 856-57, 326 N.W.2d at 676.
38. Id. at 857, 326 N.W.2d at 676.
39. See, e.g., Law Eases Visits to Children, N.Y. Tmds, April 16, 1986 at C16 (noting
the passage of the Nebraska grandparent visitation rights statute).
40. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 43-1802(1)(a) (Reissue 1993).
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in a dissolution or divorce proceeding the opportunity to petition a
court for visitation.4 ' Lastly, the statute allows grandparents to peti-
tion for visitation when the parents of the child have never married,
but paternity has been legally established.42
Regardless of the standing provision under which grandparents pe-
tition for visitation rights, the statute directs a court to ascertain
whether separate grandparent visitation is "in the best interest of the
child."43 Moreover, the statute requires a petitioner to demonstrate
that a "significant beneficial relationship" exists between the grand-
parent and the children.44 The statute fails, however, to provide a
definition for either phrase as Eberspacher v. Hulme made clear.
III. EBERSPACHER v HULME
Tricia Hulme and Rex Eberspacher were married in Nebraska in
1983.45 Prior to divorcing in 1989, the couple had two sons.46 As a
result of the divorce, Tricia was awarded custody of the boys while Rex
received visitation rights.47 At the time of the divorce, Tricia and Rex
both lived in Omaha.48 Rex subsequently moved to Parkville, Mis-
souri, and Tricia moved to Grand Island, Nebraska.49 Throughout the
divorce proceedings, Rex's parents, Carroll and Margaret, lived in
Friend, Nebraska. In 1989, Rex's visitation rights were modified to
conform to the distance between residences.5O Soon thereafter, Tricia
Hulme moved to Lincoln, Nebraska.51 Rex then pursued greater visi-
tation rights with his sons. In June 1991, Rex again petitioned the
court for expanded visitation. However, the terms of visitation were
not modified.52
In May 1992, Carroll and Margaret Eberspacher filed a petition in
the district court for Lancaster County seeking separate grandparent
visitation rights pursuant to Nebraska law.53 After a trial at which
41. NEB. RaV. STAT. § 43-1802(1)(b) (Reissue 1993).
42. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 43-1802(l)(c) (Reissue 1993).
43. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (Reissue 1993).
44. NEB. Rv. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (Reissue 1993).
45. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 203, 533 N.W.2d 103, 104 (1995).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 203-04, 533 N.W.2d at 104. The visitation rights were comprised of every
other weekend, overnight stays each Wednesday, certain alternating holiday visi-
tations, and three weeks of summer visitation, "to be exercised [one] week at a
time during the months of June, July, and August."
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Rex's visitation rights were modified allowing for one weekend visit per month,
alternating holiday weekends, and thirty-five consecutive days during the chil-
dren's summer vacation. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1801 (Reissue 1993).
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each of the parents and grandparents testified, the district court de-
nied Carroll and Margaret's petition for separate grandparent visita-
tion rights. "The district court determined that there was not clear
and convincing evidence that there is or has been a significant benefi-
cial relationship between the grandparents and the children...."54
Moreover, the district court concluded that there was not clear and
convincing evidence establishing that it was in the best interests of
the children that a separate relationship between the boys and their
grandparents continue;55 and finally, the grandparents failed to es-
tablish that such visitation would not adversely interfere with the
parent-child relationship.56
The Nebraska Court of Appeals, "after a thorough review of the
record,"57 reversed the decision.58 The court of appeals reasoned that
"separate and reasonable visitation rights ... would serve the best
interest of ... [the children] and would not adversely interfere with
the parent-child relationship of either Tricia or Rex with the chil-
dren."59 The court of appeals found that the district court's denial of
grandparent visitation rights was an abuse of discretion.60
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the appellate court deci-
sion. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the petition for grandparent visitation rights.61 After a cur-
sory review of the facts, the court found that "the undisputed evidence
of record is that the grandparent-grandchild relationship here is an
unremarkable, typical, healthy relationship."62 The court concluded
that "in light of the litigious relationship between the grandparents
and Tricia, we cannot say that the district court abused its discre-
tion."63 As a result, Carroll and Margaret Eberspacher were denied
the right bestowed on them by Nebraska's grandparent visitation
statute.




58. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 1994 WL 718511, at *17 (Neb. App. 1994), rev'd, 248 Neb.
202, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995).
59. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 1994 WL 718511, at *15 (Neb. App. 1994) rev'd, 248 Neb.
202, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995)).
60. Id. at *17.
61. Id. at 207, 533 N.W.2d at 106.
62. Id. at 208-09, 533 N.W.2d at 106-07.
63. Id. at 209, 533 N.W.2d at 107.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Nebraska's Judicial Interpretation
Given the inherent ambiguities that exist in the Nebraska grand-
parent visitation statute,64 it was left to the judiciary to give meaning
to the rights bestowed on grandparents.
1. Rosse v. Rosse: A Case of First Impression
In Rosse v. Rosse,65 the Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to in-
terpret the grandparent visitation statute. In Rosse, the court af-
firmed a district court order granting separate visitation rights to the
children's paternal grandparents after a divorce of the children's
parents.66
In an attempt to provide substance to the phrase "significant bene-
ficial interest," the court explained "it is obvious that such a relation-
ship is fact-dependent, . . . we proceed to examine this requirement
based on the facts ... *"67 An analysis of the facts led the court to
conclude that there existed clear and convincing evidence that the
grandparents enjoyed the requisite significant beneficial relationship
with their grandchild.68
The facts the court relied on included the grandmother's testimony
that her granddaughter trusted her and had slept in her arms, the
granddaughter hugged and kissed her grandmother, and told her "I
love you, Nana."69 Moreover, the facts revealed that the grandfather
took the child places such as the park and the zoo; the grandfather
was able to care for the child's needs "such as feeding and toileting
[sic],"70 and the child gave the grandfather kisses. 71
Turning to the issue of whether visitation would adversely inter-
fere with the parent-child relationship, the state supreme court con-
cluded that, although the relationship between the grandparents and
the child's mother was "strained", there existed no evidence sug-
64. See Brown, supra note 12, at 146-47 (asserting that one of the primary problems
with grandparent visitation statutes is the failure by legislatures to define the
phrase "best interests." Thus, courts are left to their own discretion in determin-
ing the child's best interest); Fernandez, supra note 15, at 123 (stating that "in
states without enumerated criteria [that define the "best interests" standard]...
the decisions are generally based on whatever criteria the judge feels is impor-
tant."); Jackson, supra note 6, at 570 (stating that the "commonly used, but ill-
defined best interests of the child standard" helps contribute to the uncertainty
that exists in grandparent visitation statutes).
65. 244 Neb. 967, 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994).
66. Id. at 975, 510 N.W.2d at 79.
67. Id. at 973, 510 N.W.2d at 78.
68. Id. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78.
69. Id. at 973, 510 N.W.2d at 78.
70. Id. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78.
71. Id.
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gesting that visitation interfered with the relationship between the
children and either parent.72 The court looked at the following testi-
mony in reaching its conclusion: The mother testified that the grand-
mother "was a liar and could not be trusted to care for Isabella in the
way [the mother] preferred."73 Also, the mother claimed that the
grandmother gave the child candy, in direct contravention to the
mother's wishes.74 The court concluded that while this testimony sup-
ported the conclusion that some acrimony existed between the grand-
parents and the mother of the child, there existed no evidence that
visitation by the grandparents would interfere with the maternal
relationship. 75
The supreme court next explained that the record did not support a
holding that the trial court abused its discretion in finding clear and
convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of the grandchild
for her relationship with her grandparents to continue.76 The court
based this conclusion on the age of the child and the fact that the
child's father also exercised separate visitation rights with his
daughter.77
While the Rosse decision lent some guidance to the interpretation
of the phrase "best interests of the child," the more important aspect of
the decision can be found in the standard of review enumerated by the
court. The appropriate standard of review established by the decision
was explicitly set forth as follows:
This case is one of first impression for this court regarding grandparent visita-
tion rights. However, we have consistently held that, in a dissolution of mar-
riage action, determinations concerning visitation with a minor are initially
entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge, whose determinations, on appeal
will be reviewed de novo on the record and affirmed in the absence of abuse of
the trial judge's discretion.... We hold that the same standard of review is to
be applied to a judicial determination of grandparent visitation rights. 78
Plainly stated, the court held that while grandparent visitation
rights are initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge, that
initial determination is subject to meaningful review by the Nebraska
appellate courts. This standard of review is the same as that applied
to determinations concerning visitation with a minor in a dissolution
of marriage action.79
72. Id. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78-79.
73. Id. at 974.
74. Id. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78.
75. Id. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78-79.
76. Id. at 974-75, 510 N.W.2d at 79.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 969, 510 N.W.2d at 76 (citing Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579,
477 N.W.2d 8 (1991)).
79. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 1994 WL 718511, at *1 (Neb. App. 1994), rev'd, 248 Neb.
202, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995).
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2. Appellate Level Review
In order to more fully appreciate the standard of review set forth
by the Nebraska Supreme Court, it is necessary to examine the role of
the appellate court as previously established by the court. The rule of
law governing the appropriate standard of appellate review was first
set forth in Guggenmos v. Guggenmos.80 In Guggenmos, the court
explained:
In a review de novo on the record, we reappraise the evidence as presented by
the record and reach our own independent conclusions with respect to the
matters at issue. A review to determine whether an abuse of discretion has
taken place is much narrower. Although an abuse of discretion does not imply
an improper motive, willful purpose, or intentional wrong, it does require the
reasons or rulings of the trial judge to be clearly untenable and to deprive a
party of a substantial right such as to amount to a denial of justice.81
Thus, according to the Nebraska Supreme Court, if grandparents
are denied separate visitation rights, on appeal the appellate court is
directed to review the record de novo and affirm the decision in the
absence of an abuse of the trial court's discretion. An abuse of discre-
tion exists if the trial judge's opinion is "untenable" or, in other words,
indefensible.82 Thus, while determinations concerning grandparent
visitation rights are initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial
judge, that initial determination is subject to plenary review by the
appellate court.
Additionally, when the trial court fails to make an essential find-
ing, the Nebraska supreme court, and a fortiori the Nebraska Court of
Appeals, in its de novo review has the power to make the necessary
essential finding. The Nebraska Supreme Court set forth this une-
quivocal rule of law in Parker v. Parker:83
We hold that the party seeking modification of a decree of dissolution bears
the burden of showing a material change of circumstances affecting the best
interests of a child, and, if a finding on that issue is not made in the trial
court, the Supreme Court, in its de novo review, may make such finding if the
evidence supports it.84
Thus, while grandparents overcame the common law obstacles de-
priving them of separate visitation rightsS5 by the enactment of the
Nebraska grandparent visitation rights statute, grandparents still
80. 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984).
81. Id. at 748, 359 N.W.2d at 90 (citing Pettegrew v. Pettegrew, 128 Neb. 783, 260
N.W. 287 (1935)). The court looked to the standard of review as first established
in marriage dissolution cases dealing with the division of property to arrive at the
appropriate standard of review in child visitation cases. Id.
82. Id.
83. 234 Neb. 167, 449 N.W.2d 553 (1989).
84. Id. at 168, 449 N.W.2d at 554.
85. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 1293-1295 (discussing the common law burdens
grandparents faced when seeking separate visitation rights.).
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face a tremendous legal challenge as set forth by the statute itself,86
as well as by the strict standard of review that must be satisfied at the
trial level and on appeal.
B. The Appropriate Application of Appellate Review
In light of the clearly stated standard of review, in order to receive
separate grandparent visitation rights, Carroll and Margaret Eber-
spacher had to meet a heavy burden. To overcome the district court
order, the grandparents were required to show, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that they enjoyed a significant beneficial relationship
with the children, that the best interests of the children would be
served if the relationship were to continue at an elevated level, and
that an award of separate visitation rights would not interfere with
either parent's relationship with the children. Moreover, the appel-
late court was precluded from reversing the trial court decision unless
it concluded that the decision was an abuse of discretion.
1. A Significant Beneficial Relationship
The appellate court began its review with an exhaustive finding of
fact with respect to each element of the grandparent visitation stat-
ute. The court first found that the evidence offered at trial was clear
and convincing in support of the conclusion that the Eberspachers
maintained a significant beneficial relationship with their grand-
sons.87 The court explained that the significant relationship began "at
the respective births of each of these children ... the grandparents
visited in the parents' home once or twice a month, despite its being a
130-mile trip, one way."8 8 The evidence also indicated that the grand-
parents took advantage of every opportunity available to visit the chil-
dren.89 In addition, the Eberspachers engaged in the following
activities with their grandchildren:
planting gardens, riding tractors, feeding cows, swimming, grilling hamburg-
ers, going to Carroll's barbershop, riding bikes, watching the ducks at the
grandparents' duck pond, renting movies, eating popcorn, playing baseball,
86. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 43-1802(2)(Reissue 1993) allows a court to grant reasonable
rights of visitation only after a grandparent establishes that a significant benefi-
cial relationship exists, or has existed, by clear and convincing evidence. This
"strict" standard of proof means "that amount of evidence which procures in the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of the fact to be proved."
In other words, it must be evidence that is "more than a preponderance, but less
than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404,
407, 482 N.W.2d 250, 253 (1992).
87. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 1994 WL 718511, at *7 (Neb. App. 1994), reo'd, 248 Neb.
202, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995).
88. Id.
89. Id. at *8.
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swinging on swings next door with a couple of little boys they love to play
with, and so forth.9 0
Moreover, the appellate court found that "despite several reloca-
tions of Rex and Tricia and the geographical impediments attendant
with such moves, ample evidence was presented to produce the firm
conviction that a significant beneficial relationship existed between
the Eberspachers and their grandsons...."91
2. The Best Interests of the Children
Moving to the "best interests of the children" element, the court,
again after an exhaustive review of the record and relevant case law,
found that separate visitation rights coincided with the best interests
of the boys.92 The court observed that the nature and extent of visita-
tion rights must be considered on a case-by-case basis with attention
to the following factors and circumstances:
[the] age and health of the child; character of the noncustodial parent; the
place where visitation rights will be exercised; frequency and duration of vis-
its; the emotional relationship between the visiting parent and the child; the
likely effect of visitation on the child; availability of the child for visitation;
likelihood of disrupting an established lifestyle otherwise beneficial to the
child; and, when appropriate, the wishes of the child.9 3
The appellate court explained that these factors were initially de-
veloped in the context of parent visitation rights following a divorce.94
However, the court noted that the factors "are appropriate reference
points in evaluating the best interests of a minor child in grandparent
visitation determinations as well."95 The court found, upon applica-
tion of the factors to the facts at bar, that the evidence established
that the boys were "ecstatic' and 'electrified' over visits with their
grandparents and that such visits are attended with hugs, kisses, and
'I love yous'."9 6 The court also determined that "ilt is obvious that the
Eberspachers have an abiding dedication to the extended family and
want [the boys] to know their father's family. . . ."97 The testimony
further showed the importance of "the children's developing a sense of
trust with [their grandparents].., so that the children would know
the extent of how much they were loved and cared for."98 In sum, the
evidence established, by a clear and convincing margin, that separate
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *15.
93. Id. at *9 (citing Gerber v. Gerber, 225 Neb. 611, 619, 407 N.W.2d 497, 503
(1987)).
94. Id.





grandparent visitation rights coincided with the best interests of the
children.
3. Interference With the Parent-Child Relationship
Looking to the third prong of the statute, whether reasonable
rights of grandparent visitation would adversely interfere with the
parent-child relationship, the court concluded that awarding Carroll
and Margaret separate visitation rights would not interfere with
either parent's relationship with the children.99 The boys' mother ar-
gued that Rex should share his visitation time with his parents. As
the appellate court pointed out, however, the statute calls for an
award of separate visitation rights to the grandparent.10 0 Moreover,
requiring the grandparents to "share" visitation time with the chil-
dren's father would likely interfere with the relationship that the boys
and their father shared.0o
With respect to the relationship between the mother and the boys,
the court explained that while "[tihe record reflects that both the
Eberspachers and Tricia exhibited rudeness and insensitivity .... "
the animosity and stress between the parties was not evidence that an
award of separate visitation rights to Carroll and Margaret would "ad-
versely oppose" the relationship between Tricia and the boys.102
Thus, in light of the conclusion that an award of separate visitation to
Carroll and Margaret served the best interests of the boys, it followed
naturally that separate visitation would not "interfere" with the rela-
tionship between the children and their mother.
The appellate court's exhaustive review of the record served two
purposes. First, the review properly fulfilled the court's judicial obli-
gation as set forth in the Rosse decision. Additionally, the review led
to an accurate application of the plain meaning of the grandparent
visitation statute.
C. Criticism of Eberspacher v. Hulme
With an outline of the appropriate standard of review, as well as
with the appellate court's extraordinarily thorough findings of fact
and law in mind, a close analysis of the supreme court's Eberspacher
opinion reveals several remarkable inconsistencies committed by Ne-
braska's highest court. As a result, the requisite appellate court re-
99. Id. at *15. The court properly noted that "any specified grandparent visitation,
particularly when resisted, will interfere... with the parents' life, schedule, and
routine. The issue is not whether it will inconvenience the parent, but whether
the visitation will adversely or unfavorably oppose the parent-child relationship
so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct it." Id. at *14 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at *15.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *13-14.
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view now stands as a vacuous formality. The district court judge who
initially handles a claim for separate grandparent visitation rights is
left to impose personal moral values, as well as his or her own subjec-
tive opinions about child-rearing, when deciding the "best interests of
the child."
1. The District Court Order Failed to Provide a Finding of Fact
or Any Reasoning in Support of Its Decision.
After a trial in which the children's parents and grandparents both
testifiedlOa the district court issued the following order:
There is not sufficient evidence to support a determination by clear and con-
vincing evidence... either (A) that there is, or has been a significant benefi-
cial relationship between the petitioners and the children,... and that it is in
the best interests of the children that such relationship continue; or (2) [sic]
that such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relation-
ship. Grandparent visitation is, therefore, denied.
10 4
Significantly, there was no finding of fact in the trial judge's order
that supports his determination regarding the absence of a substan-
tial beneficial relationship between Margaret and Carroll and their
grandchildren. Moreover, as the appellate court pointed out, "[t]he
reasoning of the trial judge does not appear in his order, and there-
fore, we are not advised of what factors he relied upon in reaching
such decision."105 Without a description of those factors relied on by
the trial judge, on de novo review, in light of all of the facts, the appel-
late court could not reach the same conclusion as that of the trial
judge.
Remarkably, the Nebraska Supreme Court eschewed the findings
of fact and conclusions of law issued by the appellate court. In so do-
ing, the court implicitly reversed a number of former decisions that lay
the foundation upon which the appellate level of review was con-
structed. Plainly stated, the appellate court, acting in consistency
with the Parker decision and faced with the absence of appropriate
findings by the trial court, made its own findings of fact in its de novo
review regarding the significant beneficial relationship between the
grandparents and grandchildren, the best interests of the children,
and whether visitation would adversely interfere with the parental re-
lationships.106 The unavoidable conclusion under Rosse was that the
district court abused its discretion, thereby depriving the Eber-
spachers of a substantial right-their right of separate visitation with
their grandchildren.
103. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 205, 533 N.W.2d 103, 104 (1995).
104. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 1994 WL 718511, at *4 (Neb. App. 1994), rev'd, 248 Neb.
202, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995).
105. Id. at *8.
106. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 234 Neb. 167, 449 N.W.2d 553 (1989) (setting forth the
applicable standard of appellate review).
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As a result of the Eberspacher opinion, the appellate court's role
became to simply "rubber stamp" the decision of the trial judge. In
effect, the Eberspacher court held that the trial court judge did not
abuse his discretion when he concluded that separate grandparent
visitation would not serve the best interests of the children. The dis-
trict court order contained no findings of fact or reasons in support of
its decision. As such, the supreme court could only speculate as to the
factors the trial judge considered in making his decision. Conse-
quently, the court promulgated a standardless rule of law that will
allow a trial judge to capriciously grant or deny visitation rights ac-
cording to any subjective standards the judge deems appropriate.
Moreover, an appellate court, faced with a skeletal district court or-
der, simply has no incentive to thoroughly develop the facts of the case
in order to ascertain whether the trial judge abused his discretion.
By failing to follow the supreme court's own established precedent,
the Eberspacher decision allows judges to impose their own morals
and views regarding child-rearing on the litigants. This form of sub-
jective judicial decision making becomes clear upon a close examina-
tion of the glaring inconsistencies between the Eberspacher and Rosse
decisions.
2. The Eberspacher and Rosse Decisions Are Factually
Indistinguishable.
The inconsistencies between the Eberspacher and Rosse decisions
begin with the fact that the court found a "significant beneficial rela-
tionship" in the Rosse case, and refused to do so in the Eberspacher
decision.107 Concededly, whether a "significant beneficial relation-
ship" exists is a fact dependent question;10 however, when the facts of
two cases are relatively indistinguishable, the first case generally
controls.1O9
In Rosse, the grandparents enjoyed a relationship with their
granddaughter that included hugs, kisses, and "I love yous." The
identical displays of affection existed in the Eberspachers' relationship
with their grandsons. Additionally, the Rosse grandparents took their
granddaughter to the zoo and to the park and cared for her physically.
The Eberspachers not only took their grandsons to the park, they also
fed cows and raised ducks with the children on the Eberspachers'
farm. Consequently, drawing the conclusion that on one hand, the
Rosse grandparents maintained a "significant beneficial relationship"
107. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 973, 510 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1994); Eberspacher v.
Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 205, 533 N.W.2d 103, 104-05 (1995).
108. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 973, 510 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1994).
109. Anthony v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 239 Neb. 404, 409, 476 N.W.2d 559, 563 (1991)
(explaining that when the facts of two cases are indistinguishable, the former
case generally controls the outcome of the latter case).
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with their granddaughter and, on the other hand, the Eberspachers'
relationship with their grandsons was not a "significant beneficial re-
lationship" is clearly inconsistent.
In attempting to distinguish the results of the cases, the Eber-
spacher court explained "[t]he undisputed evidence of record is that
the grandparent-grandchild relationship here is an unremarkable,
typical, healthy relationship.11o Thus, the court concluded that the
relationship between the Eberspachers and their grandsons did not
fall within the scope of the grandparent visitation statute. The fallacy
in the court's reasoning is found in the fact that the Nebraska grand-
parent visitation statute was designed to protect "unremarkable, typi-
cal, healthy relationships" between children and their grandparents.
The plain language of the statute requires clear and convincing evi-
dence of a significant beneficial relationship, or in other words, a typi-
cal, healthy relationship between children and grandparents."' 1
Requiring grandparents to prove anything beyond a typical, healthy
relationship results in a clear disregard of the plain, unambiguous
language of the visitation statute.
Had the Eberspacher court examined the facts as developed by the
appellate court, it would have realized that the facts of the case are
indistinguishable from those in Rosse. The Eberspacher opinion, how-
ever, wholly fails to distinguish the Rosse case. As a result, the "best
interests of the child" standard becomes a malleable concept, through
which judges at the trial level may incorporate any subjective criteria
that they consider appropriate to the case at bar.
3. The Eberspacher Court Erroneously Relied on the Fact that
the District Court Judge Observed the Witnesses.
The Eberspacher opinion relies, in part, on the fact that the district
court "observed the witnesses."1 32 As a general rule, "when the evi-
dence is in conflict, [an appellate court] considers, and may give
weight to, the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the wit-
nesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than an-
other... ."113 There exists, however, an exception to this general rule,
carved out by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In State ex. rel. Reitz v.
Ringer,114 the court explained that because the rule uses permissive
110. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 208-09, 533 N.W.2d 103, 106-07 (1995).
111. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (Reissue 1993). See, e.g., Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb.
967, 971, 510 N.W.2d 73, 77 (1994)(holding "[iln the absence of anything indicat-
ing to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary mean-
ing; when the words of a statute are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no
interpretation is necessary or will be indulged to ascertain their meaning").
112. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 243 Neb. 202, 209, 533 N.W.2d 103, 107 (1995).
113. Schulze v. Schulze, 238 Neb. 81, 84, 469 N.W.2d 139, 141-42 (1991).
114. 244 Neb. 976, 510 N.W.2d 294 (1994).
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language, "an appellate court is not required to give any weight to the
trial court's findings, much less great weight."115
Clearly, the appellate court had discretion regarding the considera-
tion it should give to the fact that the trial court judge observed the
witnesses. More importantly, the appellate court was not required to
give any weight to this consideration. The supreme court's reference
to the fact that the trial court judge "observed the witnesses" is not
grounds for reversal. The appellate court was given the discretion to
accept or dismiss the fact that the trial judge observed the witnesses.
For the Nebraska Supreme Court to rely, in part, on this fact in mak-
ing its decision is indefensible.
4. The Court's Reference to the "Litigious Relationship" Between
the Parties Was Significantly out of Context.
The Eberspacher opinion denied Carroll and Margaret separate
visitation rights, in part, because of the "litigious relationship in this
case."1 16 The extent of the "litigious relationship" between the Eber-
spachers and the children's mother consisted of the grandparents il-
ing an action seeking a declaration of visitation pursuant to their
statutory right. Moreover, the animosity that existed between the
Eberspachers and Tricia Hulme was virtually identical to that which
existed between the Rosse grandparents and the grandchild's mother.
In Rosse, the mother of the child called the grandmother a "liar"
and accused the grandmother of giving the child candy despite the
mother's explicit instructions to the contrary. 117 Additionally, the
mother testified that both grandparents "are two-faced to her."118
In Eberspacher, Tricia Hulme testified to the fact that "animosity
exists between her [Tricia] and the Eberspachers."11 9 Tricia also tes-
tified that "Carroll Eberspacher called her after he filed the petition
for grandparent visitation and said, 'I see you got my little birthday
card, huh?'"120
Based on the facts of both cases, it is clear that animosity existed
between the grandparents and a parent. What is unclear, however, is
why the supreme court labeled the relationship between the Eber-
spachers and Tricia Hulme as "litigious," while the relationship be-
tween the parties in Rosse was merely "strained."121 Arguably, the
inconsistent holdings are a result of the judges imposing their own
subjective standards on the litigants, and as a result, making moral
115. Id. at 988, 510 N.W.2d at 303 (emphasis added).
116. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 209, 533 N.W.2d 103, 107 (1995).
117. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 974, 510 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1994).
118. Id.
119. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 208, 533 N.W.2d 103, 106 (1995).
120. Id.
121. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 974, 510 N.W.2d 73, 79 (1994).
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judgments with respect to the "best interests" of the children, who are
"the primary and paramount considerations 122 in visitation cases. As
one commentator has pointed out, "[allowing a judge to impose per-
sonal values arguably is worse than directing him or her to impose
values that a legislature has chosen, because a judge is less personally
accountable to the public than is the representative legislature.1 23
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, dramatic social changes and a strong "senior
lobby" have focused increasing national attention on the rights of
grandparents to visit their grandchildren. The Nebraska legislature
responded by adopting the Nebraska grandparent visitation statute.
While the legislative response created some inherent ambiguities con-
cerning the rights of grandparents to seek separate visitation rights
with their grandchildren, the Nebraska Supreme Court exacerbated
these ambiguities when it decided Eberspacher v. Hulme.
The Eberspacher opinion is striking because the court not only ig-
nored established precedents regarding the proper standard of review
in child visitation cases, but the court refused to distinguish a case
that was factually on all fours with the Eberspacher decision. The
court's careless application of a clear statutory directive allows trial
judges to decide grandparent visitation cases capriciously. Moreover,
appellate courts will provide little solace to grandparents attempting
to reverse an arbitrary decision. The Eberspacher opinion delegates to
a trial court judge the right to issue an order unsupported by facts or
reasoning, with little fear of being reversed for an "abuse of
discretion."
The most unfortunate result, however, is that children, like the
boys in Eberspacher, will become lost in the shuffle because when the
courts make subjective value judgments with respect to the litigating
parties, the children's welfare is likely being ignored.
Christopher M. Bikus
122. Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 591, 477 N.W.2d 8, 16 (1991).
123. Fernandez, supra note 15, at 129.
